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COMPETITION, REGULATION, AND PERFORMANCE
IN TELEVISION BROADCASTING*
JOHN J. McGOWAN**
Commercial television, like the weather, is one of those institutions about
which there is much talk and little action. As with all such institutions,
opinions as to what should be done about television are as diverse as the
population itself. However, television at least has the advantage of being
the product of human endeavor and should, therefore, be tractable to hu-
man efforts to induce change if a change is in fact desired. But the reader
should be forewarned that he will find no panacea in these pages.
The more limited aim of this paper is attempting to portray the relation-
ships between industry structure and regulatory policy on the one hand, and
industry performance on the other. We begin with a brief description of
the salient features of the present structure of the commercial television in-
dustry. This is followed by an economic analysis of the determinants of
broadcasters' program policies. Finally, we discuss some of the problems
with alternative policies to improve the quality and diversity of television
broadcasting. This paper concentrates throughout on privately owned and
operated television broadcast facilities and does not deal with issues sur-
rounding public television.
I. INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
While falling under the regulatory purview of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, the commercial television industry resembles the unregu-
lated industries more than it does the traditional regulated industries, such
as transportation.' Entry into the industry is controlled by the FCC, which
* This article is an extensive revision of a paper commissioned jointly by Resources
for the Future, Inc. and The Brookings Institution, both of Washington, D.C. The
original paper served as the basis for discussion at a symposium held September 11
and 12, 1967, at Airlie House, Warrenton, Virginia. The views expressed by the author
do not necessarily represent those of the trustees, officers, or staff of either sponsoring
organization.
The author is grateful to those institutions for supporting the preparation of the paper
and to several participants in the conference whose comments led to significant modifi-
cations of the earlier analysis. The present version was written during the author's tenure
of a Social Science Research Council faculty research grant.
** Assistant Professor of Economics, Yale University.
1. For more detailed discussions of industry structure, its development and the de-
velopment of regulatory policy, see SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
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also has authority to impose restraints on broadcasters' behavior to insure
that competition between them is not impaired. But broadcasters have, de
facto, wide latitude to operate their stations in order to maximize their rate
of return on investment in broadcast facilities.
More than six hundred commercial television stations have been licensed
by the FCC and are currently in operation. Over ninety percent of these
stations are affiliated, either by contract or by ownership, with one or more
of the three national television networks.2 The commercial television sys-
tem is supported through the sale of time to advertisers for the broadcast of
commercial messages. Indeed, since the operation of local stations and the
networks is undertaken by profit-motivated individuals and organizations,
and since time sales to advertisers constitute almost their only source of
revenue, it does little injustice to reality and aids considerably in understand-
ing the functioning of the system to recognize that broadcasters conceive
themselves to be in the business of providing an attractive advertising me-
dium.
Individual stations sell time to local advertisers as well as to national or
regional advertisers. Sales of the latter type take place in the national spot
market. The buyers in this market are national advertisers who use national
spot time as a supplement to, or as a substitute for, network time. Time
sales take place at a price known as the station rate which tends broadly to
reflect differences in the size of the potential audience for a station and the
share of this audience which the station normally attracts.
Network time sales are made to national advertisers, except that the net-
works may act as sales agents in the national spot market for the stations
which they own.3 Time sales by a network are, in fact, sales of broadcast
time over their affiliated stations." The advertiser may specify which of a
COMMERCE, TELEVISION INQUIRY, 8 volumes, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE TELEVISION BROADCASTING INDUSTRY, H. R. REP. No.
607, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, HEARINGS ON
MONOPOLY PROBLEMS IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES, PART 2, TELEVISION, 4 volumes,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); F.C.C. OFFICE OF NETWORK STUDY, SECOND INTERIM
REPORT: TELEVISION NETWORK PROGRAM PROCUREMENT, PART 2, 88th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1965).
2. Each network owns five VHF stations, the maximum under an FCC regulation
which limits multiple ownership of stations to a total of seven, no more than five of which
may be VHF stations.
3. Networks are prohibited from acting as national spot representatives for stations
which they do not own.
4. At one time networks sold primarily time for the broadcast of programs provided
by sponsors. Presently, however, most network sales are sales of spots for the broadcast
of commercial messages within programs supplied by the network. This practice allows
advertisers to spread their messages throughout the program schedule and reduce risks.
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network's affiliates he wishes to utilize and the network, in turn, attempts to
gain agreement from the stations ordered to carry the network originated
program and associated commercial messages.5 Such an agreement consti-
tutes clearance of the network program by the affiliate. Affiliates which the
advertiser has ordered and which clear the network program are compen-
sated by the network at a percentage of their station rates.6
Sales to national advertisers thus constitute the sole outlet for network
time sales and, after deducting compensation to affiliates, such sales cur-
rently account for slightly more than 21 percent of total time sales by tele-
vision broadcasters. Local stations, on the other hand, have three sources
of revenue from time sales. As Table 1 shows, the predominant source of
revenue both for the network-owned stations and the other stations is from
time sales to national spot advertisers. Such sales account for well over half
the total revenue from time sales by broadcasters. Sales to local advertisers
are also an important source of revenue. Compensation from the networks
constitutes a relatively minor source of revenue for broadcasters.
TABLE 1
SOURCES OF BROADCAST REVENUE OF COMMERCIAL TELEVISION STATIONS 7
15 Network Affiliates
Owned Stations and Others Total
National Spot 66.0% 56.0% 58.2%
Local 19.9% 26.0% 24.6%
Network Compensation 14.1% 18.0% 17.2%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
It would be quite incorrect, however, to infer that network affiliation is a
minor factor in the operation of television stations. The value of network
affiliation lies not in the direct compensation received from the network but
in the access which an affiliate has to network originated programming.
The station rate which a broadcaster commands and the demand for time
on his station are functions of the size of the audiences attracted to his sta-
tion. Audience size is in turn a function of programming.
5. This is the procedure which currently prevails. Until recently, network affiliation
contracts granted to networks the right to option time over the facilities of affiliates on
relatively short notice and with limited objection rights by the affiliate. In addition,
networks used to require all national advertisers to order time on a group of affiliates
which constituted the network's "must-buy" list. This practice has been replaced by a
minimum dollar amount that the advertiser must order. For further details, see HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE TELEVISION BROADCASTING INDUSTRY, H.R. REP. No.
607, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. Chapters II and III (1957).
6. The percentage varies among networks and among the affiliates of a given net-
work but is generally between 30 and 35 percent.
7. F.C.C. ANNUAL REPORT, 1966, at 125.
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There are essentially four sources or types of programming available to
broadcasters but by far the most important single source for network affil-
iates is the network. Programs can be obtained from the network on two
bases. First, the affiliate can clear a network program during which the
network will originate commercial messages, the time for which it has sold
to national advertisers. As noted above, for such clearances the station will be
compensated at some percentage of its station rate. In addition, it will have
the opportunity to sell national spot or local time during the station breaks
adjacent to the network program. Secondly, if the national advertiser to
whom the network has sold time does not select a particular affiliate, that
affiliate may nevertheless clear the program. The affiliate will then receive
no compensation from the network but will be free to sell time within, as
well as adjacent to, the program to local or national spot advertisers. Over-
all, clearance of network programs accounts for well over 50 percent of
total programming by affiliates as the data in Table 2 demonstrate. In the
prime evening hours (6:00-11:00 P.M.) network clearances account for
over 90 percent of programming.8 Feature films, syndications, and locally
produced programs share more or less equally as alternatives to network
originated programming for local stations.9
TABLE 2
SOURCES OF PROGRAMMING BY LOCAL STATIONS, 1964-66o
Program Source Percent of Total Program Hours
1964 1965 1966
Network 54.3 58.0 58.0
Syndications 13.4 12.4 12.1
Feature Films 13.7 12.9 14.2
Locally Produced 15.5 14.7 15.6
Network programming itself is procured predominantly from independ-
ent producing companies known as program packagers. In recent years
networks have procured about 73 percent of their prime time program
hours directly from packagers. Programs produced by the networks have
accounted for another 20 percent with the balance supplied by advertisers
who have themselves purchased programs from the packagers. Thus, the
8. F.C.C., OFFICE OF NETWORK STUDY, SECOND INTERIM REPORT: TELEVISION
NETWORK PROGRAM PROCUREMENT, PART 2, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1965).
9. Syndications are primarily programs, purchased from distributors, which have
been broadcast by the networks in previous seasons (second-run syndications), but also
include programs which have not previously had a network run (first-run syndications).
10. TELEVISION MAGAZINE, August 1966, at 104. Figures are based on analysis of a
sample of over 200 stations and cover more than 25,000 hours of programming.
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program packagers supply a total of 80 percent of prime-time program
hours."'
Local stations and the networks with which they are affiliated thus com-
plement each other and each is largely dependent upon the other. Networks
supply the bulk of programming to the local stations and enable the latter
to attract viewers which creates a demand for time for commercial messages
on these stations by local and national spot advertisers. Affiliates of the net-
work provide the facilities which enable them to broadcast programs and
gain access to wide audiences which creates a demand by national adver-
tisers for network time sales.
II. COMPETITION AND PERFORMANCE IN TELEVISION BROADCASTING
Low quality and lack of diversity are the chief points upon which tele-
vision programming has been criticized and there is no need to reiterate here
the charges of the critics. Our objective is to develop a relationship between
industry structure and the behavior of broadcasters on the one hand and
industry performance, as measured by program diversity, on the other. In
developing this relationship, we shall assume that profit maximization is the
goal which broadcasters seek, and analyze first the determinants of optimal,
i.e., profit maximizing, program policy for a monopolist broadcaster. 2 This
is followed by an analysis of the effect of competition on optimal program
policies and hence on industry performance.
A. The Economics of Monopoly in Broadcasting
The product which broadcasters sell to advertisers is known as commer-
cial minutes, that is, small blocks of time within or adjacent to programs,
during which the advertiser's commercial message is broadcast. For our
purposes, the most important determinant of demand for commercial min-
utes, and hence of broadcasters' revenue, is the cost of reaching prospective
11. Kroeger, A Long Hard Look At the Genealogy of Network TV, TELEVISION
MAGAZINE, April 1966, at 37. That article is a review of a report prepared by
Arthur D. Little, Inc., on behalf of the television networks.
12. Although public service programming, such as coverage of important local, na-
tional, or international events; provision of emergency communications services; and
network expenditures for regular news coverage may not conform well with profit
maximizing behavior, an analysis of industry behavior based on the profit maximization
hypothesis is, nevertheless useful. But these deviations from profit maximization imply
that a certain degree of internal subsidization is prevalent in the broadcasting industry.
Therefore, in evaluating the effects of proposed changes in industry structure or reg-
ulatory policy, it is important to be aware of the possible effects of the changes on
broadcasters' willingness and ability to engage in internal subsidization of public interest
programming.
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buyers through television. This cost, which we shall refer to as cost per
viewer (CPV), is simply the price of commercial minutes divided by the
number of viewers or audience size at the time a commercial message is
broadcast. The first step in our analysis is to state more explicitly the rela-
tionship between audience size and broadcasters' revenue, that is, the total
revenue function for a television broadcaster.
To demonstrate the nature of the total revenue function, we introduce
the concept of a programming period. Such a period is defined as a seg-
ment of time during which advertisers are indifferent as to the clock or
calendar time at which their commercial messages are broadcast, provided
that audience size is expected to be equal for all commercial minutes within
the programming period. For example, it seems plausible that if audience
size were constant throughout all the prime-time broadcast hours of every
evening in any week, advertisers would have but slight preference as to the
particular evening or particular hour in the evening at which their messages
were broadcast. The fact that the audience is likely to vary from hour to
hour and from evening to evening does not destroy the value of the concept
of a programming period. Rather, audience variation coupled with adver-
tisers' absence of preference for particular times within the period means
that the prices of commercial minutes sold in the period must adjust so that
the cost per viewer is the same for all commercial minutes offered during
the program period.
Equalization of CPV for all commercial minutes within a programming
period is simply demonstrated by noting what would happen if a broad-
caster attempted to charge equal prices for all commercial minutes within
a period when the audience size was not equal for all commercial minutes.
Then the CPV of commercial minutes in and around some programs would
be lower than in others. Since advertisers are indifferent as to the clock
time at which their commercial messages are broadcast, they will attempt
to acquire those commercial minutes with the largest audience and hence
lowest CPV. This will create an excess demand for the high audience com-
mercial minutes, thereby bidding up their price. At the same time, the
broadcaster will find that buyers for the low audience commercial minutes
can only be found by offering them at lower prices. This process of bidding
up prices for high audience commercial minutes and bidding down prices
for 'ow audience commercial minutes will only terminate when prices have
adjusted so that the CPV of all commercial minutes within a programming
block are equalized, because only then will it not pay an advertiser to shift
his demands for commercial minutes from low audience programs to high
audience programs.
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Because prices tend to adjust to equalize the CPV of all commercial
minutes within a programming period, a broadcaster will face a different
revenue function for each such period, but each total revenue function will
depend solely upon the number of commercial minutes offered and the
broadcaster's total audience during the program period. Figure 1 illustrates
the typical form of a revenue function. For given audience size, total reve-
nue first increases, reaches a maximum, and then declines as the number of
commercial minutes offered increases. As audience size increases, the total
revenue function is shifted upward as illustrated in Figure 1. Both of these
properties reflect the fact that demand for commercial minutes is inversely
related to cost per viewer.
Given audience size, the broadcaster will offer that number of commercial
minutes which maximizes net revenue from their sale. Thus, corresponding
to each audience size there is a unique profit maximizing number of com-
mercial minutes to offer and a corresponding maximum revenue that will
be earned by the broadcaster." It is therefore possible to specify a direct
relationship between net revenue and audience size as illustrated in Figure
2. From this relationship, we can derive the marginal value of audience,
that is, the addition to net revenue which is generated by expanding total
audience by a given amount. In Figure 2, the marginal value of audience
is represented by the horizontal line labelled MVA.'4
The final concept which we need to complete our analysis of the deter-
mination of optimal program policy is the marginal profitability of a pro-
gram type. We assume that programs can be classified as to types, for ex-
ample, situation comedy, adventure, westerns, etc. Furthermore, we assume
that the program preferences of potential viewers during a programming
period can be expressed in terms of program types."5 More specifically, we
13. The profit maximizing number of commercial minutes for given audience size
is of course determined by the requirement that marginal revenue from sale of commercial
minutes equal the marginal cost of broadcasting them. If marginal cost is zero, then,
of course, the maximum point on the total revenue function defines maximum revenue
and the optimal number of commercial minutes to offer.
14. Portrayal of the total net revenue function and marginal value of audience as
linear relationships is only an expositional convenience. No conclusion of the subsequent
analysis depends upon this linearity assumption.
15. The reader may balk at this assumption, particularly if we were to maintain
that the program typology currently used in the industry is a valid basis for character-
izing viewers' preferences and measuring the extent of diversity. A group of programs
nominally called "westerns" may have nothing more in common than the attire of the
performers and the Rocky Mountains in the background. Yet it is clear that we all
have some idea as to what we mean by program types and that we do have preferences
as to how much of certain types we would like to consume (view). It is also clear that
broadcasters must have some perception, however dim, of such a preference ordering,
Washington University Open Scholarship
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assume that repeated broadcast of programs of a given type will attract
smaller and smaller additions to total audience for the program period.
Thus, if seven hours of westerns were to be broadcast during a given
programming period, we believe it reasonable to expect that the total audi-
ence for these seven hours of westerns will be less than seven times the
audience which would be attracted to a single hour of westerns."8 It is
important to recognize that the foregoing assumption of decreasing addi-
tions to total audience for additional hours of broadcast of the same pro-
gram type does not imply that the audience for the seventh hour broadcast
will be smaller than that for any of the earlier hours broadcast. It may in
fact be equal to, greater than, or less than the audience attracted to any of
the previous six hours. It is implied that the average hourly audience for
westerns will be decreased below what it was when six hours were broad-
cast by the broadcast of that seventh hour.
Now the addition to net revenue from the broadcast of an additional
hour of a given program type is the addition to total audience thereby gen-
erated, multiplied by the marginal value of audience. But costs are incurred
in the course of producing or purchasing and broadcasting the additional
hour of programming. Subtracting these costs from the addition to net
revenue gives the marginal profitability of an hour of programming of the
given type. The marginal profitability of programs of given types is not
constant but declines as additional hours of that program type are broad-
cast. Declining marginal profitability is a consequence of the fact that
broadcast of additional hours of programs of a given type attract ever de-
creasing additions to total audience."
We are now in a position to state the properties of an optimal program
policy. For a given number of total hours of programming, the program
types must be combined in such a way that the marginal profitabilities of
all program types broadcast are equal. To demonstrate this, let us assume
that a broadcaster chose a program policy for which the marginal profit-
abilities of two program types were unequal. Such a policy would not be
otherwise they would have no basis whatsoever on which to make their programming
decisions. While it would be necessary to come to grips with the problem of defining
an acceptable program typology if we were attempting to measure the extent of diversity
in television broadcasting, this is not necessary for the present purposes. All that we are
really asking is, given viewers' preferences for some goods which television broadcasters
are capable of supplying, and given broadcasters' perception of these preferences, how
will broadcasters allocate their resources?
16. The use of hours as the unit of programming is also of course arbitrary, but of
no consequence to our analysis.
17. If the unit costs of programs increases as additional hours are demanded by the
broadcaster, this will contribute further to the decline of marginal profitability of a
program type.
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optimal because profits could be increased by increasing the hours broadcast
of the program type with the higher marginal profitability and reducing
the hours broadcast of the program type with lower marginal profitability.
This switching process would increase profits because the addition to profit
from increasing output of the high marginal profitability program type
would outweigh the decrease in profits from reduced output of the low mar-
ginal profitability program type. However, because marginal profitability
decreases as output of a given program type increases, the successive addi-
tions to output of the one program type will add decreasing amounts to
total profits while successive reductions in output of the other program type
will subtract increasing amounts from total profits. When the net change
in total profits from switching an additional hour is zero, no further switch-
ing will take place and an optimal program policy will have been deter-
mined. Obviously, the net change in profits from switching between pro-
gram types is zero only when the marginal profitabilities of the program
types are equal.
It remains to determine the optimal total number of hours to broadcast
during a programming period. Here two solutions are possible: either the
broadcaster will broadcast that number of hours for which the marginal
profitability of all programs is zero, or he will broadcast as many hours as
the programming period contains. Which it will be depends on which
comes first. That is, if he has filled the programming period before the
marginal profitability of all programs is zero, then he obviously can broad-
cast no more in that period and it would be non-optimal to broadcast fewer
hours. But if all marginal profitabilities become zero before he has filled the
programming period, it is optimal to stop at that point.
Before turning to the evaluation of competition in broadcasting, it may
be helpful to restate the foregoing argument in graphical terms. Suppose
there are only three types of programs. We represent the marginal profit-
ability functions of these program types by the curves MP1, MP2, MPs in
Figure 3. The curve labelled MPT is obtained by adding the three marginal
profitability functions horizontally and represents the marginal profitability
of broadcasting when any given number of broadcast hours are allocated
optimally over the available program type. Assuming there are H* hours
in the relevant programming period, the way the figure is drawn, the broad-
caster will broadcast for the entire period and his program policy will con-
tain h1 * hours of type one programs, h2* hours of type two and zero hours
of type three.
From this graphical analysis, it is clear that the diversity of the program
policy which a broadcaster adopts for a given programming period, that is,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1967/iss4/3
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the number of program types which he uses and the proportion of total
hours devoted to each depends upon two things: (1) the relative profit-
ability of a single hour of the various program types, and (2) the relative
rates at which the contribution to profitability of additional hours of the
program types declines. In other words, diversity is determined by the rela-
tive values of the intercepts and slopes of the marginal profitability functions
for the various program types. Diversity will tend to increase as the inter-
cepts of these functions approach equality and as the functions become
more steeply sloped.
An important consequence of these propositions concerning the factors
influencing diversity is that diversity is not determined by the level of de-
mand for commercial minutes or by the level of costs of broadcast opera-
tions which are insensitive to the type of program broadcast. These state-
ments need to be modified slightly. First they are only true within the range
of costs and demand for which the broadcaster finds it optimal to broadcast
for the entire program period. In terms of Figure 3, a fall in demand or a
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
rise in costs unrelated to program types would cause a parallel downward
shift in the MPT curve. If, as a result of this shift, the new MPT curve were
to cut the horizontal axis to the left of H*, total hours broadcast would
decrease and the proportions of the two program types used would change.
However, so long as we remain within the range of cost and demand
changes which do not affect the optimal number of total hours to broadcast,
then such changes will not bring about changes in program diversity. 8
So much for the monopolist broadcaster. The reader may indeed be
puzzled why we have spent so long on his behavior when our real interest
is in the effect of competition on industry performance. The answer is of
course that the criteria of optimal program policy are the same whether the
broadcaster be a monopolist or not. Competition affects program policy not
by changing the rules upon which an optimal policy is decided, but by
influencing broadcasters' perception of the marginal profitability functions
for the various types of programming.
B. Competition and Industry Performance
One effect of competition among broadcasters arises from the likelihood
that competition will reduce prices for commercial minutes. Thus, given
advertisers' demand curves for television time, the representative commer-
cial broadcaster will face a lower net revenue function and will have a lower
marginal value of audience than a monopolist. But it is not this aspect
of competition which has important implications for industry performance
as judged by program diversity. Rather, diversity is affected because with
competition there is an expansion of resources devoted to the industry.
These effects of competition on broadcasting can be seen by first examin-
ing the effect which a doubling of available broadcast hours within a given
programming period would have on a monopolist's optimal program policy.
Reproducing the marginal profitability curves of Figure 3 in Figure 4 and
assuming an expansion of available broadcast hours from H* to 2H*,
the optimal program policy is then represented by hi**, h2**, h3**. This
policy is obviously more diverse than in our earlier example because now
programs of the third type are broadcast. We achieved this increase in
diversity by doubling the monopolist's available broadcast hours essentially
by allowing him to operate two broadcast stations instead of one.
Now let us ask whether the same allocation of time over the available
program types will occur if we allow the second station to be operated by a
18. The reader should be reminded at this point that we are assuming broadcasters
to be strict profit maximizers. If this assumption is not valid, cost and demand changes
of the type mentioned may indeed have effects on program policy.
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Figure 4
MPT
h,** h.** h1** 2H* Time
broadcaster other than our original monopolist. It is clear that if the two
broadcasters behave in the same fashion as a two-station monopolist, that
is, their individual program policies when added together give the same
aggregate allocation of time over the available program types as does the
two-station monopolist's optimal policy, then they will have chosen that
program policy which maximizes total industry profit. 9 Thus, we can call
the optimal program policy for the two station monopolist the joint maxi-
mum program policy for an industry consisting of two broadcasters. If it
were possible for the broadcasters to get together and agree to maximize
industry profits and arrange for a sharing of these profits, then the joint
maximum program policy is the one they would adopt.
But let us suppose that neither joint determination of program policies,
nor side payments from one broadcaster to the other, are allowed. Then
each broadcaster is solely interested in his own profit and not at all in-
terested in total industry profits. Our question then becomes, will program
19. The industry consists of the two broadcasters.
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diversity be the same as it would under the assumption that the broad-
casters behaved to maximize industry profits? The answer is "yes," provided:
(1) that the constraint on total broadcast hours is binding, that is, both
broadcasters find it profitable to broadcast for the whole programming
period, and (2) each broadcaster makes his program decisions in full
knowledge of the other's decisions. If the first condition is not satisfied,
the hours broadcast of all program types will exceed those which would
be broadcast by a two station monopolist."0 If the second condition is not
satisfied, then industry program policy will only eventually correspond to
the joint maximum policy as the broadcasters revise their program policies
from period to period. Since this second condition will in general not be
satisfied when there is no collusion, whether tacit or explicit, between
broadcasters, industry performance under competition may at times be
characterized by less diversity than would occur under conditions where all
broadcasters were under unified management. However, so long as broad-
cast markets are highly oligopolistic, some degree of cooperative behavior
among broadcasters is likely to arise.
The foregoing considerations lead us to conclude that, on the average,
competition among broadcasters is an efficient means of promoting diver-
sity in programming. By this we mean that industry performance given
the number of broadcast stations will, on the average, be the same when
the several broadcast facilities are independently operated as it would be if
they were operated under unified management.
One final comment on the efficiency of competition in broadcasting is in
order. Reasoning from different models of broadcasters' behavior, other
authors have concluded that competition is likely to lead to duplication,
that is, the simultaneous broadcast of the same program type by two or
more broadcasters."1 In contrast, we conclude that duplication is unlikely
to be so serious a problem as other writers have implied. The essential
20. These propositions do not seem demonstrable without recourse to a mathematical
argument. Readers familiar with Cournot models of oligopoly may find the proposition
that in the duopoly case described in the text, the duopolists acting independently never-
theless arrive at the joint maximum program policy. The reason for this perhaps
startling result lies in the assumption that the constraint on total broadcast hours is
binding upon both broadcasters. Because of this, the reaction functions of both broad-
casters for each program type coincide and the sum of the hours broadcast for each
type is the same as the total hours of that type which a two-station monopolist would
broadcast.
21. See Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences and the Workability of Competi-
tion in Radio Broadcasting, Q.J. EcoN., May 1952, at 194-223; Rothenberg, Consumer
Sovereignty and the Economics of TV Programming, STUDIES IN PUBLIO COIMzUNICA-
TION, Autumn 1962, at 45-54.
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difference between the model presented here and those used by Steiner
and Rothenberg is that they both assume the relevant decision-making
period to be the time it takes to broadcast a single program of a given type.
In contrast, we have argued that the relevant period, i.e., the programming
period, is likely to be longer, and as a consequence, optimal program policy
is likely to require the use of more than one program type for a given
programming period. So long as this is so, it will pay broadcasters to avoid
duplication whenever possible.2" Thus, duplication is likely to arise only
when optimal program policy dictates the exclusive or almost exclusive
use of a single program type."5 For under such circumstances, it will be
impossible for competing broadcasters to completely avoid duplication.
III. REGULATORY POLICY AND INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE
Broadly speaking, there are two classes of policies which can be followed
in attempting to improve performance in television broadcasting. On the
one hand, we may attempt, through public regulation, to guide the behavior
of existing broadcasters in such a way as to lead to increased program
diversity. In other words, we change the regulatory environment of the
industry but do not take specific action to change the structure of the in-
dustry, that is, increase the number of competing broadcasters. On the
other hand, we may in fact attempt to promote greater competition in
broadcasting by encouraging new entry. While these policies are not
mutually exclusive in practice, it will be convenient to discuss them sep-
arately.
A. Changes in the Regulatory Environment
If the performance of the commercial television industry fails to evoke
pride in, and respect for, the wonders of the market place in guiding private
behavior to serve the public interest, the fault does not lie in the perversity
of broadcasters. For they seem only too well to have grasped and imple-
mented the essential principles of efficient resource allocation. Disenchant-
ment with market-generated results is, however, not uncommon. Indeed,
22. It does not pay to duplicate because the broadcaster is interested in total audience
for the program period and because for a given program policy, total audience must
be larger when there is no duplication.
23. An examination of network weekly program schedules in prime-time for 1966-67
with programs classified into broad categories used in the industry showed no instance
of three-way duplication and ten instances where two networks were broadcasting the
same program type in the same half-hour periods, accounting for 13.7 percent of total
prime-time broadcasting. Duplication is much more prevalent during the daytime hours
when audiences are likely to be small no matter what type of program is broadcast and
there are few program types whose unit cost is low enough, given potential audience, to
justify broadcasting at all.
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the very foundation of industrial regulation is dissatisfaction with the re-
sults generated by profit maximization unhindered by externally imposed
constraints. This is only to say that the failure of broadcast industry per-
formance to measure up to expectations is due to the failure of regulatory
policy to provide and enforce the proper constraints on broadcasters' be-
havior. But what scope is there for broader regulation of the industry?
Clearly, the problems posed by broadcast regulation are rather different
from those posed by regulation of the classical public utility or natural
monopoly. In transportation, electricity supply, banking, insurance, etc.,
regulatory determination of the classes of service to be provided and the
setting of quality and safety standards is tolerable. Specific regulation or
program content in broadcasting is not. Likewise, transference of the
principles of rate of return regulation to commercial broadcasting is not
a feasible method of influencing program policy. While rates of return do
tend to be high in broadcasting, this is a reflection of the relative scarcity
of the products purchased by advertisers, i.e., commercial minutes. Regulat-
ing the rate of return by forcing reductions in the rate structure of television
advertising would simply bring about an increase in broadcasters' output of
commercial minutes which is, of course, not a result we want to promote.
What critics of industry performance are really asking is that broad-
casters engage, to a greater degree than they do at present, in the broadcast
of programs which are not in their own self interest to broadcast. The
regulatory problem is to achieve this and at the same time refrain from an
explicit specification of what is to be broadcast. In effect, current regula-
tory policy attempts to do this by requiring broadcasters to include a mini-
mum number of hours of public interest programming in their weekly
schedules and by interpreting liberally the concept of public interest pro-
gramming. Predictably, the way in which most broadcasters fulfill this
requirement accords with the principles of profit maximizing behavior.
Public interest programming tends to be presented when potential audi-
ences are small, so that foregone advertising revenues are minimized, and
tends to consist of low cost programs. This behavior serves to minimize
the cost of compliance with the regulatory requirement.
There is, however, an alternative formulation of the public interest pro-
gramming concept which would limit broadcasters' ability to minimize the
cost of compliance. Broadcasters might, for example, be required to broad-
cast a fixed number of hours of unsponsored programming during prime
time. During these hours, no commercial minutes could be sold, but the
broadcaster would have complete freedom to choose what types of pro-
gramming to provide. Such a policy would do away with the need for
regulators to evaluate programs to determine whether they qualify as public
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interest programming and would constrain broadcasters' ability to minimize
the cost of foregone advertising revenue. But because of these features of
the policy, the incentive to economize on program costs would be even
greater than under the present form of the public interest programming
requirement.
For the networks, the cost minimizing adjustment to such a policy would
be to go off the air during required public interest programming time; that
is, they would advise their affiliates that no network programming would
be provided at such times. Doing so would not only save them the costs
of program production, but also avoid expenditures for network intercon-
nection. For the affiliates, cost minimization would involve obtaining the
lowest cost programs to broadcast during the public interest programming
periods. In addition, they would attempt to economize further by reducing
their voluntary broadcast of public interest programming in other time
periods.
Yet it might be argued that such effective frustration of regulatory ob-
jectives could be prevented. For one thing, networks could easily be forced
to provide programming during the public interest programming periods
by requiring that no station licensee be permitted to be owned by or affili-
ated with a network which failed to do so. Then the networks would bear
the major burden of responding to regulatory policy-they would be in the
same position and have the same alternatives for cost minimization open
to them as would be presented to station licensees if networks were not re-
quired to supply public interest programming.
It might be argued further, that public pressure on the networks exer-
cised through the FCC and Congress would lead the networks to absorb
most of the costs of such a policy. If this is true, then a significant improve-
ment in industry performance might be gained. For it is probable under
such circumstances that the choice of programs to comply with the public
interest programming requirement would be made primarily on the grounds
of artistic merit and appeal to those who are most strongly critical of present
industry performance. On the other hand, there is no assurance that public
sentiment would be so effective in inducing the networks to avoid making
the cost minimizing response to such a regulatory policy. Certainly, the
response of the broadcasting industry to the present public interest pro-
gramming requirement and to criticism of its performance does not provide
much ground for an optimistic view of industry response to a strengthened
public interest programming requirement.
It is thus difficult to see how regulatory policy which would have a
strong likelihood of effectively improving industry performance and which
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would also avoid the explicit involvement of regulators in the determination
of program content can be formulated. Not surprisingly, therefore, in-
creased competition and other changes in the structure of the broadcasting
industry have been looked upon as offering the greatest prospect for im-
proved performance. It is to an evaluation of such policy which we now
turn.
B. Performance and Structural Change
Scarcity of spectrum space constrains the use of competition in broad-
casting to insure acceptable industry performance. Nevertheless, attempts
to alter industry structure through the promotion of increased competition
among commercial broadcasters and through promotion of alternative
forms of television broadcasting have advanced on two fronts. On the one
hand, the FCC has reserved part of the UHF spectrum for use by television
broadcasters. At the same time, the Commission and Congress have sought
to foster the economic development of UHF broadcasting by such means
as the All Channel Receiver Act2" and by constraining the development of
Community Antenna Television Systems (CATV) which might impair
profitability and retard development of UHF broadcasting." On the other
hand, regulatory policy has encouraged the growth of educational television
by reserving television broadcast assignments for this service. Recent Con-
gressional action on a bill to establish a Public Television Corporation is
further evidence of a growing commitment to this alternative to commercial
television."
In sharp contrast, public policy has reflected little enthusiasm for pay
television. Arguments by economists and others, that pay television would
lead to vastly improved performance over that of commercial television, rest
upon the superior ability of a price system to reflect viewer preferences and
therefore to guide broadcasters toward maximization of viewers' satisfac-
tions. Official resistance to pay television appears to be based upon doubts
about the ability of commercial television to withstand competition from
pay television. Since public policy appears already committed to increased
competition in broadcasting, and since pay television would seem to be a
desirable complement to the existing system, it is worth examining the
probable impact of competition from pay television on commercial broad-
casting.
24. 47 U.S.C. § 303(s) (1964).
25. See CATV: Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.O.2d 725, 6 P. & F. RAnro Ro. 2d
1717 (1966); CATV: Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1 F.C.C.2d 524, 5 P. & F.
RADIo REcQ. 2d 1655 (1965).
26. 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1968).
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Before proceeding, it will be well to make clear what we mean by "pay
television," since that term is subject to numerous interpretations. We use
the term "pay television" to refer to a system in which viewers are charged
on an individual program basis, for it is only such a system which clearly pro-
vides a superior mechanism for reflecting viewer preferences and guiding
resource allocation. We further require that program fees paid by viewers
be the sole source of income for the pay television broadcaster. This con-
cept of pay television thus rules out such variants as those in which viewers
pay a flat subscription fee or those in which the broadcaster sells commercial
minutes and also collects nominal program fees or a flat subscription fee
from viewers.
The introduction of a system of pay television of the type described would
obviously not confront existing commercial broadcasters with increased
competition in the sale of commercial minutes. Therefore, its sole impact
would be upon competition for viewers.
To the extent that pay television offered programs of the same types as
competing commercial broadcasters, viewers would have some program-
ming of these types available at a zero price (from commercial broadcast-
ers) and some for which a positive price must be paid (from pay television).
Only those viewers who wished to view more hours of programming of
these types than are available at a zero price, or who estimate that the
quality of pay television programs of these types justify it, would be willing
to pay the price charged. Therefore, except to the extent that pay television
provides higher quality programs of the same type than are available from
commercial broadcasters, pay television audiences for these program types
must represent additions to total viewing and not shifts from commercial
to pay television. Furthermore, loss of viewers due to quality differences
can be combatted by commercial broadcasters by improving the quality of
their own programs. Indeed, this quality competition among broadcasters
would in itself be desirable.
Likewise, the broadcast by pay television of program types unavailable
from commercial broadcasters is likely to have little long run impact on
the latter. Simply because these program types are not now available, the
potential pay television audience for them must also represent an addition
to total viewing rather than an erosion of commercial television audiences.
There are two conditions under which audience erosion is a possibility, at
least in the short run. First, commercial broadcasters may have inaccurately
assessed viewer preferences. But to the extent that competition with pay
television reveals this, commercial broadcasters can revise their own pro-
gram policies in light of this new information. Second, part of the com-
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mercial broadcasting audience for its programs may represent viewers who
would really like to be seeing something else and would be willing to pay
enough for the something else to make it profitable for the pay television
broadcaster to provide it, but who, in the absence of this alternative, watch
existing commercial television fare rather than watch nothing. Once again,
it would seem that commercial broadcasters could adjust their program
schedules to counteract audience loss from this phenomenon. The effect,
of course, would be further to improve the performance of the commercial
television industry.
On the basis of these considerations, it would be too much to say that
competition from pay television will have no impact on commercial tele-
vision audiences. But, both because commercial broadcasters have a price
advantage in competing for viewers and because they can adapt their
program policies when profitability considerations indicate that such
changes are desirable, the bulk of the pay television audience in the long
run must reflect additions to total viewing rather than erosion of commercial
television audiences. There is, however, one major qualification to this
argument.
A substantial portion of programming currently consists of television
coverage of major productions in other fields of entertainment. The most
notable example of this is the broadcast of major sports events. Another
closely related example is first television runs of motion pictures which have
generated wide interest among viewers as a result of their regular movie-
house runs. Since large audiences seem virtually assured for this type of
programming, competition among broadcasters for the television rights for
major sports events and popular movies is extremely intense.
Because the profitability of a given program of this type may be quite
different for a pay television broadcaster than it is for a commercial broad-
caster, there exists the possibility that commercial broadcasters would be at
a disadvantage relative to pay television in competing for broadcast rights.
If commercial broadcasters were so disadvantaged, pay television might
consistently win out in the competition for television rights. This would
lead to large audience losses and, hence, to reduced profitability of commer-
cial broadcasting.
Even though it might be doubtful that these losses would be large enough
to jeopardize the viability of commercial television, there is a further con-
sequence of the shifting of programs from commercial to pay television.
This is that viewers would then have to pay to see certain events which
were previously available free of charge. Therefore, to the extent that pay
television successfully would bid away broadcast rights from commercial
broadcasters, viewers would suffer a welfare loss.
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The possibility of incurring such a welfare loss is, of course, not sufficient
justification for resisting the development of a pay television system. A
rational and omniscient policy-maker attempting to decide whether a given
expansion in the resources devoted to private television broadcasting, i.e.,
spectrum space, should be allocated to commercial or pay television, would
choose in favor of that form which made the greatest contribution to viewer
welfare. Thus, in determining the potential benefit from choosing pay tele-
vision he would add together the increase in viewer welfare arising from
the broadcast by pay television which is unavailable on commercial tele-
vision at present and the improved quality of commercial television pro-
grams stemming from competition with a pay television system. From this,
he would subtract the loss in viewer welfare arising from the switching of
the broadcast of unique events from commercial to pay television. Finally,
he would weigh the benefit so determined against the benefit generated by
devoting the same increase in resources to commercial television and opt for
the alternative with higher benefits.
While no one can relish the thought of attempting the estimation of
benefits along the lines outlined above, looking only at the possibility of
incurring some welfare loss by promoting pay television is surely a poor
substitute for such an analysis and an inadequate basis for formulating
public policy toward pay television. At the same time, the possibility of
incurring a welfare loss should lead us to consider more carefully the ad-
visability of promoting pay television as a complement to the existing
system.
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, no clear cut and simple policies for improving the per-
formance of the commercial television broadcasting industry emerge from
our analysis. Both the form of organization which the privately owned
television broadcasting system in the United States has taken and the under-
standable desire to avoid a direct regulatory role in the determination of
program policies impose severe constraints upon the scope for improvement
in industry performance which regulatory policy can offer. In the face of
these difficulties, public policy has perforce had to look primarily toward
expansion in the alternatives available to viewers as the only feasible means
of improving performance. Yet scarcity of spectrum space once again
imposes limitations on the extent to which increased competition in broad-
casting can be relied upon to bring about improved performance. Because
of this limitation, it is important to ensure that whatever additional re-
sources are devoted to private television broadcasting be used so that they
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will make the greatest possible contribution to the performance of the
industry.
To those schooled in the subtle workings of price systems and aware of
their effectiveness in guiding resource allocation, it may seem clear that
the public interest would be best served if any expansion of private tele-
vision broadcasting were to take the form of pay television. But the reti-
cence of policy makers to accept with alacrity the concept of pay television
as a desirable complement to the present system of commercial television
should not be lightly dismissed. So long as we fail to provide reasonably
convincing evidence that their fears are misplaced, policy makers will con-
tinue to resist the development of pay television.
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